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Abstract
In this article, we use data from the European Community Household Panel to evaluate the
impact of a French guaranteed income program, the RMI, on the the hazard out of unem-
ployment. Self-selection into the program is corrected using a multivariate duration model
developed by Abbring and van den Berg (2003). We find that RMI receipt has a strong
negative impact during the first months of program participation, but that this disincentive
effect quickly falls to insignificant levels after six months. Household structure also ap-
pears to be an important determinant of the importance of the adverse effect of program
participation.
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1 Introduction
Income maintenance programs were primarily designed to provide poor individuals
or families with the means to uphold a minimal standard of living. While equity
considerations and distributional issues were the main reasons these programs were
created, rising caseload and the increasing cost for public finances, especially in
times of high unemployment, have quickly raised concerns about their potentially
adverse effects on recipients’ labour supply behaviour. The debate over such side
effects has focused on issues such as poverty and inactivity traps associated with
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high effective marginal tax rates on labour income, the loss of job skills or, more
generally, of human capital that was likely to deter re-entry into employment.
Empirical studies of the impact of means-tested benefits on the labour supply be-
haviour of its recipients have mainly focused on the North American labour mar-
ket. A large non-experimental literature has concentrated on the effects of USA’s
AFDC program and its post-1996 version, the TANF. Both programs have been ex-
tensively studied. A survey of the empirical evidence on their effects on the labour
market behavior of its recipients can be found in Moffit (2001), and the impact of
the 1990’s welfare reform is discussed in Blank (2002) and Grogger and Karoly
(2005). The findings confirm that such programs reduce hours of work, with an
estimated effect ranging from 10 to 50%. Effects of common features of these pro-
grams, such as earning disregards or work requirement have also been evaluated.
While experimental evidence (Michalopoulos et al., 2005) has shown that strong
financial incentives increased labour market participation, especially when coupled
with work requirement; non-experimental studies have concluded that lowering the
benefit reduction rate (the rate at which benefits are withdrawn as labour income
rises), although increasing the labour supply of welfare recipients, had no sizeable
impact on overall labour force participation because some non-recipients cut their
labour supply to gain eligibility.
Lessons, however, can also be learnt from European income maintenance pro-
grams, as the level and extent of these programs are typically more important and
widespread in the ’old world’ than in North American countries. France, in par-
ticular, has implemented since December 1988 a nationwide means-tested bene-
fit, the Revenu Minimum d’Insertion (RMI hereafter) providing households below
a given income threshold with a monthly guaranteed minimum income. Over the
years, as more and more unemployed became eligible and took-up the benefit, RMI
has evolved into what has been described as a "[new] component of the unem-
ployment compensation system" in official reports (Commissariat Général du Plan,
2000), raising concerns about its possible effects on labour supply. Indeed, unlike
AFDC/TANF, eligibility to the RMI is not restricted to certain types of families,
neither is receipt limited to a given amount of time, or conditioned on work re-
quirements. Also, unlike UK’s Income Support, eligibility is not limited to those
unable to work. For the sizeable fraction of its recipients that are unemployed, the
RMI can be seen as a substitute for traditional unemployment insurance. Because
RMI involves no degressivity and no job search requirements, its effects on labor
supply behavior are likely to be stronger than traditional UI benefits that typically
impose stronger requirements designed to increase job search incentives. Moreover,
rising caseload (over one million households since 1996, compared with roughly
2.5 millions receiving traditional UI) increases the likelihood that the aggregate im-
pact of RMI on unemployment is sizeable We therefore examine in this article how
RMI receipt affects the transitions into employment for its unemployed recipients.
In contrats with the majority of studies of welfare programs that have used a static
framework, focusing on labour force participation rates, average hours worked or
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earnings, we adopt a dynamic framework by focusing on individual transition rates
from unemployment to employment.
In the absence of controlled experiments specifically designed to evaluate income
maintenance programs in France, the identification of the effect of RMI recipiency
relies on the fact that a fraction of eligible individuals will not, for various reasons,
actually take-up their rights to the benefit, thus providing us with a comparison
group to evaluate the causal effect of RMI receipt. Indeed, the literature on welfare
participation has shown that eligible individuals usually exhibit an imperfect take-
up behaviour, with a take-up rate ranging between 40 and 80% according to the
type of benefit (Hernanz et al., 2004; Currie, 2004); and which crucially depends
on their prospects on the labour market. However, because potentially unobserv-
able characteristics driving the take-up behaviour might be correlated with labour
supply, participation in the RMI program cannot be considered exogenous, even in
a sample of eligible individuals, and after controlling for observable characteristics.
Our empirical method deals with this potential endogeneity of welfare participation
through the estimation of a multivariate duration model that allows identification
of treatment effects (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003). Our results show that par-
ticipation in the RMI program reduces the hazard rate to employment by about
38%; adding between 4 and 9 months to the unemployment spells of its recipients.
However, this impact varies significantly among different household types, and de-
creases sharply with the length of the welfare spell.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We describe the RMI program
and its link to the unemployment compensation system in Section 2 and present our
data in Section 3. We discuss the estimation procedure in Section 4 and comment
on the results in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The RMI program
The French welfare system has largely been built around various programs aimed at
specific categories of individuals (the disabled, the elderly, the single parents, etc.).
The sharp rise in unemployment during the late 70’s and 80’s had made clear that
the French social security system lacked an universal benefit that would act as an
income maintenance program for those not targeted by the various benefits already
in place. To fill the gap in the safety net, the Revenu Minimum d’Insertion was
created in December 1988, and provides every household below a certain income
threshold with a guaranteed income. In January 2000, the income threshold was
e 389 for a single person, e 583 for a 2 persons household, e 700 for a 3 persons
household, and e 155 for each additional member 2 . Eligibility to the benefit is
2 The net monthly minimum wage for a full-time job was e 866 in 2000. The guaranteed
income represents about 60% of the official poverty line for the corresponding household
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triggered if the household’s average income over the previous three months falls
below the threshold. The actual benefit paid is defined as the difference between
the household’s income (including other income transfers) and the threshold. It is
reassessed every three months, and is paid for as long as the households remains
eligible.
Since its introduction, the RMI caseload has risen threefold, from 400,000 in 1989
to over 1.2 millions in 2003. Its total cost has followed a similar path, and has
reached e 4.8 billions, about two third of the budget allocated to welfare programs
addressing social exclusion in France. Figure 1 shows the evolution of caseload and
cost (in constant 2000 e) from 1989 on.
Figure 1. RMI caseload and cost
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The evolution of RMI caseload appears to be linked to variations in the unem-
ployment rate. Figure 2 plots the unemployment rate and the proportion of RMI
recipients in the population aged 25 and more 3 ; and shows that, after an initial
rise in caseload, the two proportions follow similar paths. A more detailed study by
Jacobzone (1996) has shown that the inflow of RMI recipients was impacted by the
flow into uncompensated unemployment with a three to six months delay. Unlike
United Kingdom’s Income Support, which is specifically targeted to those who are
not actively seeking work, the RMI has no specific eligibility rules concerning the
type.
3 One must be at least 25 to qualify for RMI receipt.
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claimants’ labour market status. Thus, individuals who have exhausted their rights
to UI benefits, or who have not worked long enough to trigger UI entitlement will
become eligible to RMI benefits as soon as their income fall below the threshold.
In this respect, the RMI program bears some resemblance with Germany’s Arbeit-
slosenhilfe (now Arbeitslosengeld II), which also covers unemployed individuals
without UI entitlement. Moreover, individuals who cannot work are often entitled
to other, more specifically targeted, benefits (Allocation Adulte Handicapé for the
disabled, Allocation Parent Isolé for lone parents, Social security benefits for the
long-term sick, etc.). Hence, a substantial fraction of RMI recipients are not out of
the labour force nor unable to work, and are considered as unemployed 4 , and RMI
has become a de facto form of unemployment benefit. In January 2004, new rules
aimed at providing more work incentives to RMI recipients, and hiring incentives
to potential employers have been introduced. Renamed "RMA-CI" (Revenu Mini-
mum d’Activité-Contrat d’Insertion), the modified version of RMI, a recipient that
finds a new job can receive its full wage, while the employer only pays the differ-
ence between the newly hired’s salary and his RMI allowance. A study of registered
unemployed (Observatoire de l’ANPE, 2002), comparing RMI recipients and non
recipients, has found that the former are disproportionately male and low-educated:
75% have not completed high school, versus 60% of non recipients. However, they
also find that RMI recipients registered with the employment agency (ANPE) have
slightly better characteristics than unregistered RMI recipients.
Although the relation between RMI and unemployment have been widely acknowl-
edged, RMI rules retain unappealing features with respect to work incentives. The
RMI being a differential allowance, its beneficiaries are subjected to a 100% im-
plicit tax rate on any additional income below the threshold, severely limiting the
financial gain from switching from welfare to labor income (Join-Lambert, 1998;
Pisani-Ferry, 2000; Laroque and Salanié, 1999). In some cases, since the RMI is
linked to other welfare benefits, switching from RMI to part-time employment can
actually lower the household’s disposable income. Because of these adverse finan-
cial incentives, we expect the RMI program to have a strong negative impact on
the transition rate from unemployment to employment. However, other features of
the RMI program have been designed to offset the adverse effects of the benefit
on job seekers. First, the welfare earnings top-up program (intéressement) allows
a RMI recipient that starts a new job to continue to receive the RMI benefit at full
rate for 3 months (lowering the implicit marginal tax rate to 0%), and at half rate
for another 9 months (generating a 50% implicit marginal tax rate during that pe-
riod). Stronger financial incentives, as well as incentives for employers to hire RMI
recipients have been added in 2005, but our data only covers years 1997 to 2000.
Second, the RMI program includes a compulsory ’insertion contract’ whereby re-
cipients, with the help of their caseworker, define priority actions they undertake to
do in order to improve their social inclusion. These actions might include health,
housing, job search etc. About 90% of ’insertion contracts’ state that job search is
4 Over 60% of RMI spells end with a transition to employment, Afsa and Guillemot (1999)
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the recipient’s main priority, but RMI recipients are not obliged to follow the case-
worker’s suggestions about the content of the contract. It is estimated that only half
of RMI recipients have actually signed an insertion contract (Zoyem, 2001), mainly
because caseworkers have not asked the other half to do so. Moreover, although
sanctions can theoretically be pronounced for non-compliance with the contract,
very few are actually pronounced. This weak conditionality of benefit receipt to
compliance with insertion contracts is reinforced by the fact that the administration
in charge of benefit payment differs from the one in charge of the insertion con-
tracts. So, although such ’insertion contracts’ have been found to reduce welfare
dependency in the Spanish case (Ayala and Rodríguez, 2006), doubt can be cast on
the actual efficiency of such non pecuniary incentives in the French case. Although
Zoyem (2001) has found that such contracts had a positive effect on transitions
from welfare to work, his study does not correct for the endogeneity of contracts,
thereby over-estimating their effects. Roughly one half of insertion contracts (22 %
of RMI beneficiaries) have signed a contract involving some sort of training. These
training sessions could in principle involve a lock-in effect and lead to longer un-
employment spells for those taking part. However, only a fraction of recipients are
engaged into such training, so this potential lock-in effect should not affect our re-
sults in a significant way. Unfortunately, our data does not include information on
insertion contracts 5 , and this study will only focus on the overall effect of RMI
receipt.
In a recent paper, Gauthier (2008) conducts a thorough study of the RMI program in
a partial equilibrium search framework. His main conclusions are that individuals
on RMI should have a lower exit rate into employment than equivalent individuals
not on RMI. Moreover, when a temporary disregard is added to the program 6 ,
Gauthier (2008) finds that it should have an adverse effect on re-employment rates
if the disregard is high enough, and no effect if it is too low.
Despite the strong link between RMI and unemployment, and the unambiguous
theoretical predictions, empirical studies of the causal effect of welfare recipiency
on labour supply behaviour in France have been scarce; and their conclusions are
still at debate. Maurin and Torelli (1992) conclude that RMI receipt does not have
a statistically significant impact on the employment probability on the following
year, and that it has a negative and significant impact on transitions out of the
labour market. More recently, Granier and Joutard (2002) conclude that RMI re-
ceipt has no effet on the exit rate from unemployment, except for single parents 7 .
5 To our knowledge, no dataset including both RMI recipients and non-recipients provide
information about insertion contracts.
6 As it is the case with the actual RMI rules, see above
7 This finding could be explained by the fact that, in their dataset (Enquête-Emploi),
Granier and Joutard only observe RMI receipt at interview dates. This left-censoring of
RMI spells could lead to biases in the estimates if RMI effect is time-varying. See also
footnote 12
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Figure 2. Unemployment rate and proportion of RMI recipients
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Using a different methodology, centered on the financial gains from exiting from
unemployment, Gurgand and Margolis (2008) conclude that most RMI recipients
would experience an increase – very small on average – in their disposable income
by switching to paid employment; and that the RMI top-up program has very lit-
tle impact. Although many jobs found by RMI recipients are low paid, short term
contracts, the conclusions of their study tend to minimize the potential inactivity
trap effect induced by the RMI program 8 . Another study by Margolis and Starzec
(2002), which uses a detailed simulation of French taxes and transfers, also con-
cludes that inactivity traps effects are not significant. On the contrary, Laroque and
Salanié (2000, 2002) and Piketty (1998) insist on the importance of financial in-
centives on the exit rate from unemployment, and on the disincentive effects of the
RMI program, especially on women.
Most – if not all – studies of the impact of welfare programs have overlooked the
non take-up phenomenon that is now widely documented in the literature (Mof-
fitt, 1983; Duclos, 1995, 1997; Blank and Ruggles, 1996; Blundell et al., 1988;
Bollinger and David, 2001; Riphahn, 2001; Hancock et al., 2004). Take-up of the
RMI benefit has been studied by Terracol (2002), who finds that up to 35% of el-
8 Although individuals would earn more if they were re-entering employment, that does
not mean they would choose to do so, because of associated costs (child care, transporta-
tion) or a high disutility of labour.
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igible individuals chose not to sign-up for the benefit. The fear of social stigma is
thought to be one on the main causes for non take-up of welfare benefits by eligible
agents, along with participation costs and imperfect information on the availabil-
ity of the benefit (Besley and Coate, 1992; Dahan and Nisan, 2006). Because of
this self-selection phenomenon, the issue of non take-up must be tackled when try-
ing to assess the impact of welfare programs on its recipients. Non participation
in a welfare program by eligible individuals is driven by characteristics not always
observables by the analyst, and those characteristics may be correlated with the
unobservables diving the process of labour supply. Hence, program participation
is probably endogenous in a model of unemployment duration, even when one fo-
cuses on a sample of otherwise similar poor and low-educated eligible individuals,
and must be modeled as such. Our estimation strategy is thus based on the model
developed by Abbring and van den Berg (2003), which allows the identification of
a dynamic treatment effect in a duration model framework, where the treatment is
not independent of the outcome of interest.
3 Data
We use the first seven French waves of the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP) data set, between 1994 and 2000. This data set contains detailed infor-
mation on individuals’ household structure, labour market status and income on a
monthly basis. RMI receipt is also recorded monthly 9 . Although the ECHP does
not contain an RMI eligibility variable, we are able to compute it by adding all rele-
vant income types 10 received each month by all members of the household 11 , and,
following official eligibility rules, calculate whether the average household income
over the previous three months falls below the threshold corresponding to the in-
dividual’s household structure. If an household is classified as eligible, all its adult
members are considered eligible. The ECHP was not targeted towards low-income
households, and might under represent RMI recipients, as this population is usually
harder to reach and follow over time. However, it is the best suited dataset for our
study since its detailed calendars allow us to follow households’ income and indi-
viduals’ transitions in the labor market on a monthly basis. Moreover, individuals
9 The French version of the ECHP questionnaire has a specific item for RMI receipt, sep-
arate from other social exclusion benefits.
10 The ECHP income calendar lists 34 types of income. The RMI eligibility rules excludes
certain types of income from the threshold calculation, such as bursaries or negative income
tax. Note that UI benefits are included in the calculation of the household’s income and that
both UI and RMI benefits can be received at the same time if the former is low enough for
the household not to cross the threshold.
11 Changes in the household structure can be computed using the "household composition"
form indicating the dates of arrival of new household members, as well as the date of
departures of former members.
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who moved between two waves were interviewed in their new dwellings, rather
than discarded from following waves 12 .
Because eligibility to the RMI program depends on an income threshold which
varies according to the household structure, and because the UI replacement rate
depends on a variety of factors, only a fraction on unemployed individuals will ex-
perience one or more eligibility spells while unemployed. Those latter individuals
are typically young, without enough contributions to benefit from unemployment
insurance, or are long term unemployed who have exhausted their rights to UI ben-
efits. To construct our sample, we have selected all the unemployed individuals
that have participated during at least a month in the RMI program (or if one adult
member of the household reports RMI receipt), as well as all the unemployed that
have experienced at least a month of eligibility 13 (even if they did not take up their
rights) during their unemployment spell. Hence, only the unemployment spells long
enough to trigger eligibility to the RMI program via a drop in households’ income
are included in the sample. This over sampling of long spells will be corrected for
in our statistical model. Moreover, because single mothers with children under 3
years of age can receive a specific benefit higher than the RMI threshold (and will
thus never be eligible), they are discarded from our sample.
After discarding left censored unemployment spells, and censored ongoing spells at
36 months, our final sample consists of 1078 unemployment spells, 584 of which
end with a transition into employment, and 494 are right censored 14 . This rela-
tively small sample size should be kept in mind when analyzing results, as coeffi-
cients will be less precisely estimated than in a larger sample.
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the main variables 15 for the whole sample,
12 Another popular choice for studies of RMI recipients is the French Labor Force Survey
(Enquête-Emploi. However, it only provides information on RMI recipiency at the date of
the interview, and seniority in the program is not known. This left-censoring of RMI spells
seems ill suited for a study where the timing of events is an essential part of the empirical
analysis. Moreover, the ECHP has a better coverage of RMI recipients than the Enquête
Emploi does (Terracol, 2003))
13 Because of the common under reporting of income in questionnaire surveys, it is possible
that some of the households whom we classify as eligible are in fact not eligible.
14 Among the 494 censored spells, 138 (27.5%) are censored due to panel attrition. We
assume throughout the paper that attrition is independent of the duration processes, con-
ditionally on the included covariates and unobserved heterogeneity. This is a common hy-
pothesis in duration analysis; and van den Berg et al. (1994) found that, in their setting,
explicitly modeling the attrition process had no impact on estimated coefficients.
15 Apart from the variables Spell duration, Transition into employment, Months before el-
igibility, Months before RMI receipt and Unemployment insurance, figures in the table are
the values of these variables at the beginning of the unemployment spell. The variable Un-
employment insurance takes the value 1 if the individual has benefited from unemployment
insurance for at least a month during their unemployment spell, and 0 otherwise.
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and according to RMI receipt. For each variable, we indicate the result of a t-test
with unequal variances for the null hypothesis that the two sub samples have equal
means. Those summary statistics indicate that, despite some minor differences,
both populations are quite similar. The only statistically significant differences be-
tween the two sub samples concern household structure and unemployment-related
variables. The sub sample of RMI recipients contains proportionally more single
parents and less one-person households than the sub sample of eligible non ben-
eficiaries. Its members are typically younger, have longer unemployment spells
and benefit less often from unemployment insurance. More than half of unemploy-
ment spells, for RMI recipients and non-recipients alike, end with a transition into
employment, which is consistent with the findings of Afsa and Guillemot (1999).
Eligibility to the RMI benefit occurs relatively early in individuals’ unemployment
spells, and those taking-up the benefit do it relatively early (the 1.5 month differ-
ence between eligibility and actual receipt is likely to be largely due to adminis-
trative delays). The observed unemployment spells is on average 6 months (60%)
longer for RMI recipients than for individuals who do not take up their rights, which
indicates a potential strong adverse effect of RMI receipt of the transitions out of
unemployment. Non-parametric estimates 16 of the survival functions depicted in
Figure 3 suggest that program participation have a strong impact on re employ-
ment probabilities. Non parametric tests reject the null hypothesis of the equality
of survival functions at the 1% level. 17
Our sample statistics show some dissimilarities with administrative data that are
worth commenting. First, our sample contains more couples (with and without chil-
dren) than can be found in administrative data. This coud be explained by the fact
that some unmarried couples might tell their caseworkers that they are single in
order to avoid their partner’s income to be included in the calculation of their en-
titlement level. Another reason for this difference might be that individuals living
in homeless shelters are not sampled in the ECHP, and they constitute a sizeable
fraction of the single-persons RMI recipients. Interestingly, our sample statistics
for household composition are similar to those obtained from other labour-force
surveys, such as the one used in Granier and Joutard (2002), or the more specific
survey of RMI recipients in Lhommeau (2001), who analyses the discrepancies be-
tween administrative and survey data on RMI recipients. Second, individuals in our
sample seem to be more educated than what can be observed in an administrative
dataset. Again, it could be explained by the exclusion of the homeless from the
sampling scheme of the ECHP and because, more generally, the less educated in-
dividuals might have more disrupted histories and be more difficult to follow from
dwelling to dwelling. These discrepancies, while difficult to avoid when using sur-
vey data, might lead to inaccuracies in the estimates of RMI receipt.
16 These estimates take into account the stock-sampling bias that arises from our sampling
scheme.
17 Log-rank test: χ2(1) = 11.57, p-value=0.0007; Wilcoxon test: χ2(13.71), p-
value=0.0002
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Figure 3. Survival estimates
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4 Statistical model
In our data, for each unemployment spell, we observe the time elapsed until the
individual becomes eligible to the RMI benefit, as well as the (possibly censored)
time elapsed until she actually receives it. We also observe the length of her (possi-
bly censored) unemployment spell. Our empirical analysis will focus on how RMI
receipt affects the time to re-employment. Because welfare participation might
be correlated to unemployment duration via their unobserved determinants, even
among a sample of eligible individuals, one cannot consider program participa-
tion as exogenous, and must analyse the two processes jointly. Indeed, a growing
literature on take-up behaviour have shown that agents choose whether or not to
participate into welfare programs according to observed and unobserved charac-
teristics. See for example Moffitt (1983), Duclos (1995, 1997), Blank and Ruggles
(1994), Bollinger and David (2001), Hancock et al. (2004) and others. Concerning
the RMI program, Terracol (2002) has estimated an average take-up rate of 65%,
with some variations across household types.
We start our analysis by specifying a Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) duration
model for the transitions from unemployment to work 18 . Let tr be the date of the
18 See van den Berg (2001) for a survey of duration models.
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first RMI receipt, and 1(tr<t) a dummy variable indicating if the individual is par-
ticipating in the program at time t 19 . The hazard function out of unemployment
is:
λu (t|X , tr,δu) = λu0 (t)exp
(
Xβ +θ1(tr<t)+δu
)
where λu0 is the baseline hasard, X is a vector of observable characteristics 20 , and
δu is a random variable representing the unobserved characteristics affecting the
hazard out of unemployment. θ represents the effect of RMI receipt on the hazard
rate, and is the parameter of interest of our study.
The conditional density function of tu|X , tr,δu is thus:
fu (tu|X , tr,δu) = λu (tu|X , tr,δu)exp
(
−
∫ tu
0
λu (τ|X , tr,δu)dτ
)
(1)
Participation in an income maintenance program is likely, as argued earlier, to be
endogenous to unemployment duration. Using a bivariate probit model on Canadian
data, Christofides et al. (1997) show that participation in a welfare program is neg-
atively correlated with labour market participation. Moreover, the analysis of the
non take-up phenomenon for the RMI program by Terracol (2002), strengthens the
hypothesis of a correlation between the two processes. Indeed, if eligible individu-
als choose whether or not to participate in the RMI program based on unobserved
characteristics, the latter will probably be correlated with the unobserved charac-
teristics affecting the duration of unemployment spells. The existence of take-up
costs including regular meeting with the caseworker and filling out forms, or social
stigma (Moffitt, 1983) can lead to such an endogeneity. Indeed, individuals who
expect to exit early from unemployment can choose not to incur these costs be-
cause they feel the short length of their future welfare spell will not outweigh the
costs. Hence, we should expect a negative correlation between the unobservables
affecting the hazards to employment and to RMI.
To correct for this potential endogeneity, we follow Abbring and van den Berg
(2003) and jointly model the processes of unemployment duration and of entry into
the RMI program.
We thus define the hazard rate into RMI receipt as:
19 It is assumed that individuals taking-up the RMI benefits do so for the rest of their un-
employment spell.
20 In our application, all covariates are (potentially) time-varying. The formal exposition of
the model does not explicitly consider time-varying covariates in order to keep notations
simple.
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λr (t|Z,δr) = λr0 (t)exp(Zγ+δr)
where λr0 is the baseline hasard, Z is a vector of observable characteristics, and
δr is a random variable representing the unobserved characteristics affecting the
hazard into program participation.
The conditional density of tr|Z,δr is:
fr (tr|Z,δr) = λr (tr|Z,δr)exp
(
−
∫ tr
0
λr (τ|Z,δr)dτ
)
As explained in Section 3, our sample only contains unemployment spells with at
least one month of eligibility to the RMI program. This method over samples long
unemployment spells. To correct for this sampling bias, we condition the p.d.f.
of unemployment duration and of time before program participation on the corre-
sponding survival function until RMI eligibility.
This is equivalent to the traditional stock sampling correction method used when
the sample is drawn from the stock of unemployed rather than from the flow.
To incorporate this sampling bias correction into our model, denote te the date
when the individual becomes eligible to the RMI program. Define Su (te|X ,δu) and
Sr (te|Z,δr) as:
Su (te|X ,δu) = Pr(tu ≥ te) = exp
(
−
∫ te
0
λu (τ|X ,δu)dτ
)
Sr (te|Z,δr) = Pr(tr ≥ te) = exp
(
−
∫ te
0
λr (τ|Z,δr)dτ
)
Note that Su (te|X ,δu) does not depend on tr since eligibility always occur before
actual program participation.
The corrected density functions of tu and tr, conditional on the these durations being
greater than te are:
f (tu|X , tr,δu, tu ≥ te) = f (tu|X , tr,δu)Su (te|X ,δu)
and
f (tr|Z,δr, tr ≥ te) = f (tr|Z,δr)Sr (te|Z,δr)
Finally, we need to model time to eligibility in a separate equation. Indeed, because
individuals can only be treated if eligible, comparisons between RMI recipients and
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non recipients must control for the process of entry into eligibility 21 . We thus take
the hazard function into eligibility to be:
λe (te|G,δe) = λe0 (t)exp(Gη+δe)
where, as before,G is a vector of observable characteristics, and η is a conformable
vector of coefficients to be estimated. δe represent the unobserved characteristics
affecting the duration until eligibility. The conditional density function of te|G,δe
is:
fe (te|G,δe) = λe (te|G,δe)exp
(∫ te
o
λe (τ|G,δe)dτ
)
Because δu, δr and δe are not observable to the econometrician, we must integrate
this terms out of the likelihood function. Let G(δu,δr,δe) be the joint distribution
of the unobserved heterogeneity terms . The joint density function of tu, tr and te,
conditional on X ,Z, but unconditional on δu,δr and δe is:
fc,r,e (tu, tr, te|X ,Z)=
∫
δu
∫
δr
∫
δe
fu (tu|X , tr, te,δu) fr (tr|Z, te,δr) fe (te|Z,δe)dG(δu,δr,δe)
(2)
See Abbring and van den Berg (2003) for a proof of the nonparametric identifica-
tion of such models, and van den Berg et al. (2004) and Abbring et al. (2005) for
applications on the effect of sanctions on the transition rate out of unemployment.
A key assumption for the identification of θ is the ’no anticipation’ assumption.
It requires that entry into program participation at time tr does not affect the indi-
vidual’s behaviour before tr. If program participation has an adverse effect on the
transition rate out of unemployment, and if individuals who anticipate program par-
ticipation reduce their search intensity beforehand, then our estimate of the impact
RMI receipt will be under-estimated. However, although it might be possible that
individuals do anticipate RMI receipt and modify their behaviour accordingly (for
example by reducing their search effort beforehand), it is likely that they will only
do so when they become eligible, and apply for welfare receipt at the same time.
Therefore, the only delay between eligibility and participation for these individuals
will be caused by administrative delays. Richardson and van den Berg (2006) argue
that if anticipation occurs shortly before actual treatment is received (as it is likely
in our case), then the bias on the parameter of interest will be small.
We finally need to specify the joint distribution of the heterogeneity terms. Fol-
lowing Heckman and Singer (1984), we assume that δc, δr and δe have a trivariate
distribution with two masspoints each. In order to keep the estimation tractable, we
impose that δe be perfectly correlated 22 with δr. In other words, each value of δe
21 We thank a referee for pointing this out.
22 Positively or negatively.
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is associated with a given value of δr.
Let δcg, g = (1,2), δrh, h = (1,2) and δe j, j = (1,2) be the masspoints of the
heterogeneity terms, the associated probabilities are:
δc1 δc2
δr1, δe1 P11 P21
δr2, δe2 P12 P22
Conditional on X ,Z, tr, te and on values of δu, δr and δe, the likelihood functions
become:
lgh j =
[
λu (t|X , tr,δcg)Su (tu|X , tr,δcg)
Su (te|Z,δcg)
]ci [Su (tu|X , tr,δcg)
Su (te|X ,δcg)
]1−ci
[
λr (t|Z,δrh)Sr (tr|Z,δrh)
Sr (te|Z,δrh)
]ri [Sr (tr|Z,δrh)
Sr (te|Z,δrh)
]1−ri
f
(
te|G,δe j
)
(3)
where (g,h, j)∈{1,2}×{1,2}×{1,2}, and ci (resp. ri) is a dummy variable taking
the value 1 if the individual exits from unemployment (resp. participates in the RMI
program), and 0 otherwise 23 .
The baseline hazard for unemployment duration, λu0 (t), is specified as a piece-
wise constant function of time by including the following time dummies among
the regressors in the unemployment duration equation 24 : dt, t = 1..5 : d1= 1(t≤3),
d2= 1(3<t≤6), d3= 1(6<t≤12), d4= 1(12<t≤24) and d5= 1(t>24). The baseline haz-
ard for program participation, λr0(t), is specified as a quadratic function of log-
time, which ensures sufficient flexibility while reducing the number of parameters
to be estimated. Finally, since the durations until eligibility are typically short (3.7
months on average), we use a constant baseline hazard for the corresponding pro-
cess.
Using the joint distribution of the heterogeneity terms described above, we obtain
the following expression for the sample likelihood, unconditional on the hetero-
geneity terms:
LL=∑
N
ln
[
2
∑
g=1
2
∑
h=1
Pghlgh j
]
(4)
23 Since all the individuals become eligible, we do not need to consider the corresponding
hazard and survival functions separately.
24 The first dummy is excluded from the equation to avoid colinearity with the constant
term.
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The likelihood of equation (4) is then maximized using an EM algorithm (Dempster
et al., 1977).
5 Results
The impact of RMI receipt on unemployment hazard is estimated using three spec-
ification. In the first one (specification A), it enters the model as a simple time
varying dummy variable 1(tr<t). This specification thus assumes that the effect of
welfare participation is constant over time and across household structures. In the
second (specification B), we relax the assumption of a constant impact of RMI re-
ceipt over time, and use a series of dummies reflecting the seniority in the program.
Finally, specification C allows the effect of program participation to vary according
to the household structure, but not over time.
For each specification, three versions of the models are estimated. In Model (1),
program participation and time to eligibility are assumed exogenous 25 . Model (2)
allows the unemployment duration and time to treatment to be correlated through
their unobserved heterogeneity components, but considers the time to eligibility
to be exogenous. Finally, Model (3) is the full model specified in Equation (3)
where all processes are jointly modeled. In this last model, one of the probabilities
of the heterogeneity distribution had to be constrained to zero in order to reach
convergence. As can be seen in Table 5, this probability was already small (lower
than 5%) in Model (2), so that the constraint we imposed has a small impact on the
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
Results are displayed in five separate tables. Table 2a shows the estimated coeffi-
cients for the unemployment hazard equation, excluding the variables controlling
for RMI receipt, which are displayed in Table 2b. Table 3 shows the results for the
program participation equation, and Table 4 for time to eligibility. Finally, Table 5
presents the estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity parameters.
The variables used in the unemployment hazard equation are sex, a dummy for
unemployment insurance, dummies for household structure, age and education.
Macroeconomic conditions are controlled via the local unemployment rate. Inde-
pendent variables in the participation equation are sex, UI receipt, the local unem-
ployment rate, age, education and household structure. Although the identification
of the model does not rely on exclusion restrictions or additional distributional as-
sumptions (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003), we have included, in addition to the
set of covariates already present in the unemployment duration equation, the ratio
of the rate of RMI recipients in the district to the local unemployment rate. This
variable comes as a proxy for social stigma as defined by Besley and Coate (1992).
25 The second part of Equation 3 is thus dropped from the likelihood of Model (1).
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Their model links the level of social stigma in the society to the difference in av-
erage labour disutility between welfare recipients and the rest of the population.
Assuming that labour disutility is uniformly distributed in the population, then a
higher rate of welfare recipients implies a lower level of labour disutility among
welfare recipients. Our proxy is thus inversely proportional to social stigma.
Our comments will first focus on results from Tables 2a, 3 and 4 26 before turning to
the coefficients related to program participation in Table 2b and heterogeneity terms
(Table 5). Since the estimated coefficients of the unemployment hazard equation
in the full model are similar to those from Models (1) and (2), we will focus on
Model (3) in our comments of the impact of socio-economic variables. Moreover,
the three specifications of the impact of RMI receipt leave other coefficients mostly
unchanged.
Consistent with the empirical literature on unemployment spells, the estimates
show that the baseline hazard out of unemployment first increases between 0 and
6 months, then decreases steadily afterwards. The coefficient for sex is statistically
significant and indicates that the hazard rate for women is about two thirds of that
of men. Household structure does not have a significant impact, but couples seem
nevertheless to exit from unemployment into employment quicker than singles. Age
does have a statistically significant effect on the hazard rate, which declines as the
individuals get older. Education is only significant for those who have a college
degree in specification C, but coefficients nonetheless indicate that, as expected,
the hazard rate increases with education. The local unemployment rate, introduced
as a proxy for macroeconomic conditions has a negative, although not significant,
impact on the hasard rate. Consistent with the results obtained in the empirical lit-
erature on unemployment spells, receipt of UI benefits significantly decreases the
hazard by approximately 30% (1-exp(-0.30)).
Results for the program participation equation (Table 3) show that the baseline haz-
ard for this process is decreasing until month 6, then strongly increasing. While sex
does not have a significant impact on program participation, the hazard rate into
RMI receipt is significantly reduced as individuals get older. Household structure
also plays a key role in the decision to participate in the welfare program: single
parents will choose to benefit from the RMI much earlier than singles without chil-
dren; while couples without children will tend to experience a longer unemploy-
ment spell before participating in the RMI program. The latter are the only ones
that do not significantly differ from single persons without children. As expected,
UI receipt lowers the hazard rate to program participation by reducing the amount
that eligible individual can claim. A higher local unemployment rate, because it
lowers the probabilities of finding a stable source of income, greatly increases the
hazard into RMI receipt. Finally, the ratio of the rate of RMI recipients to the lo-
26 Since these tables report parameters that are not our primary concern in this paper, we
will not dwell on them.
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cal unemployment rate, which is used as a proxy inversely proportional to social
stigma, significantly increases the hazard into program participation 27 . This is con-
sistent with Terracol (2002), who finds a significant impact of social stigma on the
take-up of welfare programs.
Regarding time to eligibility, results shown in Table 4 indicate that the household
structure is the main determinant of the duration process leading to RMI eligibility,
with singles having the highest hazard rate, followed by single parents, childless
couples and couples with children.
We now turn to the impact of welfare receipt and on the coefficients presented in
Table 2b. Looking at the average impact of RMI receipt as estimated in specification
A, estimation of the joint model leads to a lower estimated impact of RMI receipt
on unemployment hazard than in Model (1), and estimation of the full model leads
to a further decrease in the magnitude of the coefficient. This change in coefficients
illustrates the bias arising from an improper modeling of the take-up behaviour. If
individuals with lower prospects on the labour market tend to take-up their rights to
the RMI benefits faster than others, one will observe a spurious negative impact of
RMI on hazard rates when this dynamic selection effect is not taken into account.
The coefficient for RMI receipt in Specification A indicates that program partic-
ipation cuts the hazard rate into unemployment by about 38%. This rather strong
disincentive effect of RMI receipt could be explained by the stationary environment
it provides to its beneficiaries: being non degressive and involving no sanction in
case of lack of adequate job search or other administrative non compliance, the
RMI seems to provides few incentives to job seekers. However, as richer specifi-
cations will show, this average effect hides large variations in time and the longer
term effects of RMI is considerably smaller.
Specification A assumed that the impact of welfare receipt was constant over the
whole program participation spell. We now turn to the study of the evolution of the
effect of program participation with time.
Unlike unemployment benefit, the RMI provides a stable income to its recipients,
for an unlimited duration. Hence, one could expect the effect of RMI receipt to be
constant over time. Other factors can nevertheless have an influence on the impact
of RMI receipt. A stigma caused by a transition from unemployment insurance
to the less valued social status of welfare recipient may lead to a strong effect of
RMI receipt in the first months. Conversely, a discouragement leading to a slow
withdrawal from the labour market can induce an increase in the effect of RMI
receipt over time. In both cases, distinguishing between short and long term effects
can be informative on the presence of transitory effects.
27 In model (2), the coefficient of the ratio varies greatly across specifications, but is very
robust in Model (3).
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We thus introduce a series of dummy variables for the length of ongoing welfare
spells : drt , t = 1..5: dr1 = 1(0≤t−tr≤1); dr2 = 1(1<t−tr≤3); dr3 = 1(3<t−tr≤6); dr4 =
1(6<t−tr≤12) and dr5 = 1(t−tr>12).
Allowing for time-varying effects of welfare participation leaves other coefficients
mostly unchanged. Estimated coefficients show that the impact of RMI receipt
on the hazard rate out of unemployment, while strongly negative during the first
month, steadily decreases during the first six months of program participation, be-
fore stabilizing after month 6 at a low and insignificant level 28 .
In addition to a potential stigma effect, the very strong negative impact of program
participation during the first few months can be explained by a sudden increase in
the households’ income up to a level greater than the last three months’ average
income. This effect is likely to be strengthened by the fact that recipients actually
receive the benefit with a delay of several weeks after signing-up, during which
their income is likely to fall further below the guaranteed income.
For some individuals, RMI receipt occurs after the exhaustion of their UI entitle-
ment, and acts as a substitute of the latter. Our estimates suggest that, despite the
lower amount brought by the RMI, its effect is, at first, stronger than the average
effect of UI benefits, at least during the first six months of program participation.
This initial drop if exit rates could be explained by the fact that, contrary to UI
rules, RMI recipients face no threat of being excluded from the program for inade-
quate search activity, and that they are guaranteed to experience no decrease in their
benefits. However, a more precise analysis of the effects of switching from UI to
RMI would require an explicit modeling of the unemployment benefit entitlement
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
The long-term effect (i.e. after 12 months of receipt) of RMI receipt is equivalent to
a 14% decrease in the transition rate into employment. Moreover, this long terme
effect is not significantly different from zero. The rather strong average effect of
RMI receipt found in Specification A thus hides substantial variations with time
and should only be considered as representative of the first year of program partic-
ipation.
How do these time-varying treatment effects translate into additional time spent
into unemployment for RMI recipients? Because the baseline hazard function, the
28 Note that, as in Specification A, Model (3) generally leads to lower estimates of RMI
receipt than Models (1) and (2). In particular, longer term effects are now found to be
insignificant. Again, theses lower estimates reflect the fact that individuals who quickly
enter eligibility and benefit receipt generally have worse unobserved labor market charac-
teristics. Because Models (1) and (2) did not (or did only partly) allow for a correlated
unobserved characteristics, the corresponding coefficients were biased towards a stronger
negative effect of RMI receipt. The reader should however keep in mind that our relatively
unfortunately leads to less precise estimates.
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characteristics of individuals remaining in unemployment, and the impact of wel-
fare receipt vary with time, the effect of RMI on unemployment duration might vary
with the timing of entry into welfare within the unemployment spell. Using the es-
timated coefficients of Specification B, Model (2), we have computed the estimated
survival function for a representative individual whose characteristics take the av-
erage values in the corresponding sub sample under 4 scenarios: (i) if she never
benefits from the RMI program – the baseline scenario; (ii) if she begins her wel-
fare spell on her first month of unemployment; (iii) if she begins her welfare spell
on her sixth month of unemployment; and (iv) if she begins her welfare spell on her
twelfth month of unemployment. Figure 4 plots those estimated survival functions.
Because RMI receipt has no impact on hazard rates before tr, the estimated survival
functions are identical to the baseline one until tr. These survival functions allow us
to compute the impact of RMI receipt at time tr on the additional unemployment
duration. More precisely, given that the individual has been unemployed until tr
without receiving welfare payments, what is the impact of taking-up the benefit at
tr on the median additional unemployment duration? Table 6 gives, for various val-
ues of tr (1, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months) the additional median duration of unemployment
spells 29 for those still unemployed at tr under the baseline scenario of no RMI re-
ceipt (line 1), and under alternative scenarios where individuals enter welfare in
tr (line 2) 30 . The third line of Table 6 gives the additional median unemployment
duration induced by taking up the benefit at tr, together with the corresponding in-
crease as a percentage of the baseline additional median duration. Figures in the
third line of Table 6 answer the following question: if individuals who have been
unemployed until tr without welfare participation were randomly assigned to treat-
ment (RMI receipt) and control (no RMI receipt) groups, how much longer would
the median unemployment duration be for the treated compared to the controls?
These estimates show that RMI receipt adds between 4 and 8 months to the median
remaining unemployment duration (between 48 and 69% of the remaining duration
under the baseline scenario), depending on the timing of entry into welfare. The
later individuals enter welfare, the stronger will be its impact on unemployment
duration. This nonlinearity is driven by the interaction between the nonlinearities
in the baseline hazard and the nonlinearities in the treatment effect of program par-
ticipation, as well as by the fact that individuals that have remained unemployed
until the date when we assign them to the program have less favorable characteris-
tics than those who have left earlier.
While the effect of program participation varies with time, it may also differ across
household types. Indeed, the income level guaranteed to RMI recipients varies ac-
29 i.e. the median length of time before half of the corresponding population have made a
transition into employment.
30 These durations were computed using the mean values of the regressors for individuals
who have remained unemployed until tr without RMI receipt. These ‘typical’ individuals
thus have different characteristics under each scenario because individuals with the most
favorable characteristics tend to stay unemployed for a shorter period of time.
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Figure 4. Survival functions according to time before RMI receipt
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cording to household structure, using an implicit equivalence scale where the sec-
ond individuals in the household (whether an adult or a child) is given a weight of
0.5, the third person a weight of 0.3, and any additional members a weight of 0.4.
Although the second member of a household is given a similar weight regardless of
his age, it is unlikely that an unemployed member of a childless couple will behave
in the same way as a single mother of one drawing the same amount of benefits
from the RMI program. Specification C distinguishes the impact of RMI receipt for
four household categories: one-person households, single parents, childless couples
and couples with children.
The coefficients for RMI receipt indicate, for all household structures, a weaker
effect of program participation on unemployment duration than in the model where
program participation is considered exogenous. They remain statistically signifi-
cant, excepts for single parents, for which no significant effect have been found.
The fall in the hazard rate is about 50% for singles without children, 40% for cou-
ples without children, 33% for couples with children, and 16% for single parents.
The estimated impact of program participation is lower for household with children
(for couples and singles). The presence of children seems to lower the negative
effect of RMI receipt. The increase in the households needs that their presence
induce increases their marginal utility of income, and the incentives to increase the
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household’s income by exiting from unemployment 31 . The strong effect affecting
singles without children may be explained by a discouragement effect affecting this
category of unemployed, possibly reinforced by a stronger social insulation.
Results from the three specifications used in our empirical analysis lead to the fol-
lowing conclusion: There is an unambiguous negative effect of RMI on the re-
employment rate of its beneficiaries, but this effect is heterogeneous with respect
to both household characteristics and seniority in the program. To mitigate these
effects, the caseworkers in charge of the "integration" part of the RMI program
should focus on the very first months of program participation where the disincen-
tives effect of RMI seem to be the largest 32 . Likewise, single-persons households
should be a primary concern for a policy aiming to reduce the negative effect of
RMI receipt.
6 Conclusion
The problem of potential inactivity traps and labor disincentives generated by wel-
fare benefits such as a guaranteed minimum income is at the heart of the debate
on social policy in Europe and the United States. The French Revenu Minimum
d’Insertion (RMI) program on which we focus in this article is, with over 1 million
households receiving payments, central in the country’s welfare system. Initially
created as a way to "fill the gaps" in the social safety net, it has increasingly been
used as a form of unemployment compensation benefits for individuals who could
not qualify for the traditional unemployment insurance system, and is a good candi-
date for the study of the impact of social welfare receipt on labor supply behavior.
In this article, we analyse the effect of RMI receipt on the transition rates from
unemployment to employment.
Like many social transfers, RMI suffers from imperfect take-up, and not all eligible
households actually choose to apply to the program. The self selection of recipients
from a population of eligible bars us from simply contrasting the hazard rates of
recipients and non recipients. Instead, we estimate a multivariate duration model à
la Abbring and van den Berg (2003) to correct for the endogeneity of RMI receipt.
We find that RMI has a substantial negative impact of the hazard out of unem-
ployment, but that this effect is limited to the first 6 months of receipt, and drops to
31 The RMI being a differential allowance, an increase in family-related benefits will not
increase the household’s total income for RMI recipients.
32 Although this paper does not evaluate the impact of an enhancement of the "integration"
policy for RMI recipients, it seems natural, as a first approximation, to assume that it will
be more efficient if applied to the individuals who are affected the most by the disincentive
effects.
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insignificant levels afterwards. This estimates imply that RMI receipt adds between
4 and 9 months to unemployment spells, depending on the timing of entry into the
program. Moreover, we find that the impact of the program varies across household
types, and is weaker in households with children.
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Table 3
Program participation equation
Specification A Specification B Specification C
Model (2) Model (3) Model (2) Model (3) Model (2) Model (3)
ln(t) −3.340
(0.193)
∗∗ −2.498
(0.178)
∗∗ −2.202
(0.237)
∗∗ −2.497
(0.178)
∗∗ −2.892
(0.256)
∗∗ −2.496
(0.178)
∗∗
ln(t)2 0.860
(0.064)
∗∗ 0.470
(0.059)
∗∗ 0.612
(0.074)
∗∗ 0.470
(0.059)
∗∗ 0.755
(0.079)
∗∗ 0.470
(0.059)
∗∗
Woman −0.068
(0.132)
−0.007
(0.119)
−0.268
(0.168)
−0.005
(0.119)
−0.096
(0.169)
−0.007
(0.119)
UI −0.676
(0.146)
∗∗ −0.429
(0.138)
∗∗ −0.403
(0.178)
∗ −0.429
(0.138)
∗∗ −0.542
(0.176)
∗∗ −0.429
(0.138)
∗∗
Local unemployment rate 0.101
(0.026)
∗∗ 0.056
(0.024)
∗ 0.084
(0.033)
∗ 0.056
(0.024)
∗ 0.063
(0.032)
∗∗ 0.056
(0.024)
∗∗
rate of RMI recipients in the district
local unemployment rate 1.780(1.384)
1.545
(1.263)
4.530
(1.860)
∗ 1.541
(1.264)
5.809
(1.832)
∗∗ 1.544
(1.263)
Age −0.051
(0.008)
∗∗ −0.028
(0.006)
∗∗ −0.029
(0.009)
∗∗ −0.028
(0.006)
∗∗ −0.031
(0.008)
∗∗ −0.028
(0.006)
∗∗
Education −0.094
(0.048)
† −0.055
(0.044)
−0.073
(0.061)
−0.055
(0.045)
−0.016
(0.061)
−0.056
(0.044)
Single (reference)
Single parent 1.275
(0.208)
∗∗ 0.564
(0.179)
∗∗ 1.313
(0.266)
∗∗ 0.566
(0.179)
∗∗ 1.072
(0.239)
∗∗ 0.5622
(0.180)
∗∗
Couple without children −0.191
(0.187)
−0.101
(0.186)
−0.126
(0.253)
−0.100
(0.185)
−0.216
(0.258)
−0.103
(0.186)
Couple with Children −0.112
(0.159)
−0.106
(0.158)
−0.362
(0.211)
† −0.107
(0.157)
−0.479
(0.216)
∗ −0.107
(0.158)
Note: standard errors in parentheses
Significance levels: †: 10% ∗: 5% ∗∗: 1%
Table 4
Time to eligibility equation
Specification A Specification B Specification C
Woman −0.182
(0.194)
−0.221
(0.188)
−0.177
(0.194)
Single parent −0.472
(0.290)
† −0.506
(0.279)
† −0.473
(0.290)
†
Couple without children −0.689
(0.379)
† −0.709
(0.344)
∗ −0.689
(0.383)
†
Couple with children −1.138
(0.358)
∗∗ −1.379
(0.323)
∗∗ −1.389
(0.368)
∗∗
Age −0.003
(0.010)
−0.001
(0.009)
−0.003
(0.009)
Education 0.003
(0.061)
−0.012
(0.059)
0.004
(0.061)
Note: standard errors in parentheses
Significance levels: †: 10% ∗: 5% ∗∗: 1%
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Table 6
Median additional duration at time tr
tr
1 3 6 9 12
Baseline scenario 8.63 8.73 9.48 10.82 11.09
Receipt at month tr 12.80 13.94 14.73 16.99 19.65
Additional median duration
(%)
4.17
(48.33)
5.20
(59.56)
5.26
(55.51)
6.17
(57.03)
8.56
(77.21)
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